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ABSTRACT
The paper introduces a generic approach to solving Sequential Security Games (SGs) which utilizes
Evolutionary Algorithms. Formulation of the method (named EASG) is general and largely game-
independent, which allows for its application to a wide range of SGs with just little adjustments
addressing game specificity. Comprehensive experiments performed on 3 different types of games
(with 300 instances in total) demonstrate robustness and stability of EASG, manifested by repeatable
achieving optimal or near-optimal solutions in the vast majority of the cases. The main advantage
of EASG is time efficiency. The method scales visibly better than state-of-the-art approaches and
consequently can be applied to SG instances which are beyond capabilities of the existing methods.
Furthermore, due to anytime characteristics, EASG is very well suited for time-critical applications,
as the method can be terminated at any moment and still provide a reasonably good solution - the
best one found so far.
1 Introduction
Game theory (GT) offers mathematically justified solutions to many practical problems arising in various domains, e.g.
economics [1], biology [2], politics [3] or social networks [4]. One of the fast-growing GT areas is security management
(e.g. border controlling, police surveillance, anti-terrorism policy, patrolling schedules, etc.). The majority of these
applications base on the concept of Security Games.
Security Games (SGs) are typically two-player Stackelberg Games [5]. One of the players - the leader (a.k.a. the
Defender in SGs) commits to a strategy first and then the other player - the follower (a.k.a. the Attacker in SGs) chooses
their strategy - based on the already announced leader’s strategy. Such a sequence of decisions introduces asymmetry of
information access, favoring the follower. The above concept fits certain real-life security-related scenarios in which the
Attacker can surveil the guards (playing the Defender’s role) patrolling some critical area and discover / deduct their
patrolling strategy.
The list of successfully deployed real-world applications of SGs includes the scheduling system for Los Angeles
International Airport canine patrols [6], the PROTECT system which randomizes schedules of US Coast Guard’s
resources in Boston harbour [7], the TRUSTS system for scheduling patrols for fare inspection in Los Angeles Metro
system [8], or the PAWS system to prevent poaching and protecting wildlife in Queen Elizabeth National Park in
Uganda [9]. Please consult a recent survey paper [10] for other examples.
In SGs the goal is to find a pair of players’ strategies that correspond to the Stackelberg Equilibrium (StE) [11]. Since
the Attacker is aware of the opponent’s strategy in advance, their strategy is a consequence of the Defender’s strategy
(they choose a strategy which provides them the highest possible payoff). Hence, the problem of finding StE in SGs can
be reduced to finding an optimal Defender’s strategy. While the task is trivial in the case of pure strategies, in the mixed
strategies space it becomes NP-hard [12].
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On a general note, there are two major types of SGs solution methods: exact and approximate. Majority of the proposed
exact approaches employ Mixed-Integer Linear Programming (MILP) [13, 6, 14, 15] and, consequently, suffer from poor
time scalability which hinders their application beyond a certain level of game’s complexity. Approximate methods, on
the other hand, offer much better scalability but at the cost of finding close-to-optimal solutions [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21].
This paper follows the latter approach and adopts Evolutionary Algorithms metaheuristic [22], which has proven
efficient in solving other types of bi-level optimization problems [23, 24].
Evolutionary Algorithms (EAs) are inspired by the process of (biological) evolution. Each member of a population in
EA represents a candidate (valid) solution. In the iterative process of creating new generations three evolution-related
operations: mutation, crossover and selection are performed. Despite the lack of rigorous proofs of convergence to the
optimal solution, EAs - thanks to their experimentally proven efficiency - have been widely applied to a wide range of
real-life optimization problems, e.g. [25, 26, 27, 28].
In the context of GT, Sefrioui et al. [29] applied co-evolutionary algorithm for computing the Nash equilibrium on a
fluid dynamics problem and compared the results with Pareto Genetic Algorithms [30]. A similar approach, relying
on colonial competitive algorithm [31], was proposed in [32]. There were also certain attempts of using EAs for
finding StE [33, 34, 35], however, all of them were designed for simple one-step games. To our knowledge, the only
successful application of evolutionary methods to sequential SGs was proposed in [36], however this approach is
domain-dependent and its application is limited to a specific genre of SGs, i.e. games played on a plane with moving
targets.
1.1 Contribution
The main contribution of this paper is an introduction of the first evolutionary approach to finding near-optimal solutions
of a wide range of SGs in a computationally efficient manner. The method, abbreviated as EASG (Evolutionary
Algorithm for Security Games), is domain-independent and flexible, i.e. applicable to various SGs formulations
(one-step, multi-step, general-sum, with limited observability, with bounded rationality, etc.) with little adjustments
only. Furthermore, due to anytime characteristics, EASG is specifically well suited for time-critical applications in SG
domain.
EASG is tested on three types of SGs, where it demonstrates optimal or close-to-optimal performance, while excelling
the competitive approaches in terms of time scalability.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 presents a formal description of sequential Security
Games. Section 3 provides an overview of the state-of-the-art approaches to SGs, used in the experimental evaluation
of EASG. A detailed description of all EASG components is presented in the next section. Section 5 is devoted to
experimental setup (EASG parametrization and tuning, as well as description of benchmark games), which is followed
by presentation of experimental results in Section 6. The last section contains conclusions.
2 Problem definition
We consider n step games with two players: the Defender (D) and the Attacker (A). In each time step (τ1, . . . , τn)
player p chooses action api (p ∈ {D,A}, i = 1, . . . , n) from the set of available actions M(spi ) where spi is a state of
player p in time step τi. State s
p
i is determined by previous player’s actions, his initial position and the opponent’s
actions. Players are not aware of the opponent’s actions.
For each game state s there are four predefined payoffs Uk(s) (k ∈ {A+, A−, D+, D−}) representing the Attacker’s
reward (UA+(s)), their penalty (UA−(s)), the Defender’s reward (UD+(s)) and their penalty (UD−(s)), resp. Some of
the states (usually those with high UA+(s) values) are distinguished and called the targets.
If in any time step τi(i = 1, . . . , n):
• The Attacker and the Defender move to the same state (say si), then the game ends (the Attacker is intercepted)
and the players receive payoffs UA−(si) and UD+(si), resp.
• The Attacker reaches any of the targets (say sj) and is not intercepted, then the game ends and the respective
payoffs are equal to UA+(sj) and UD−(sj).
Otherwise, the game lasts for n time steps and ends with neutral payoffs.
A pure strategy of the player is defined as an assignment of one action to each potentially reachable state of the game.
Please observe that the same action of the player may lead to several reachable states depending on the opponent’s
action selection [37].
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Let’s denote a set of all pure strategies of player p by Σp. A mixed strategy pip ∈ Πp, where Πp is a set of all possible
mixed strategies of player p, is a probability distribution over Σp.
The game model employs Stackelberg Game (StG) principles which means that first the Defender commits to their
strategy piD ∈ ΠD (probability distribution of their moves) and then the Attacker, being aware of piD, determines their
strategy piA.
Let’s denote by Up(piD, piA) an expected utility value of player p as a result of the game played according to mixed
strategies piD and piA. Stackelberg Equilibrium can be formally defined as a pair (piD, piA) satisfying the following
equations:
BR(piD) = arg max
piA∈ΠA
UA(piD, piA) (1)
arg max
piD∈ΠD
UA(piD, BR(piD)) (2)
Equation (1) defines the Attacker’s best (optimal) response BR(piD) to the Defender’s strategy piD while eq. (2) selects
the best Defender’s strategy against the optimal Attacker’s response. In order to avoid unambiguity, if there exist more
than one best Attacker’s response, Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SStE) was defined [11] in which the Attacker,
among all their best responses (with the same highest utility for them), selects the one with the highest Defender’s
utility, i.e. breaks ties in favor of the Defender. In this paper SStE version of StE is considered.
3 State-of-the-art Approaches
The vast majority of hitherto approaches to solving StG were focused on one-step game formulations and either couldn’t
be applied to the multi-step case considered in this paper, or their application would be highly inefficient. In the
literature there is just a handful of methods devoted to multi-step extensive-form StG, all of them developed in the last
few years.
The first notable approach (BC2015) was introduced by Bos˘anský and C˘ermák in 2015 [14]. The authors extended a very
popular MILP-based method DOBBS [38] to extensive-form games and introduced a novel algorithm for computing
SStE, able to exploit the underlying structure of sequence-form games. The method is designed for non-zero-sum games
and reduces the size of a linear program by transforming an extensive-form game into its equivalent sequence-form
representation. In effect, the the size of a linear program is reduced from exponential (as in DOBBS) to linear with
respect to the game tree size, but still exponential with respect to the game length. An exact formulation of MILP
utilized in BC2015 can be found in [14].
Another approach to exact computation of SStE for two-player extensive-form general-sum games was proposed
by C˘ermák et al. [15]. The method (henceforth referred to as C2016) utilizes a correlated version of SStE known
as Stackelberg Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium (SEFCE). In SEFCE, the Defender can send signals to the
Attacker who must follow these signals in their choice of the best response. C2016 relies on a linear program for
computing SEFCE and then modifies it by iteratively restricting the signals the Defender can send to the Attacker and
thus converging to SStE. In the experimental evaluation presented in [15], C2016 was superior to BC2015 in terms of
time efficiency.
One of the recent heuristic approaches to SStE approximation was the Mixed-UCT method [39, 20] which incorporates a
variant of Monte Carlo Tree Search, known as Upper Confidence Bounds [40]. The authors [20] subsequently proposed
another UCT-based approach - O2UCT [19, 41] which relies on a guided sampling of the Attacker’s strategy space
interleaved with finding (using double-oracle method [42]) a feasible Defender’s strategy for which the just-sampled
Attacker’s strategy is the optimal response. Experimental evaluation of O2UCT shows the method’s ability to find
optimal or close-to-optimal solutions for various types of test games and better time-scalability than both the above
mentioned exact MILP methods.
Another approximate method (denoted by CBK2018) [18] is a heuristic time-optimized MILP approach which constructs
a smaller game tree representation with a specific abstraction structure called gadgets. The method significantly reduces
the Defender’s strategy space and therefore, brings down computation time requirements, however at the cost of loosing
theoretical MILP property of convergence to the optimal solution. A diminished game is solved with the C2016 method.
Four algorithms summarized above (two exact: BC2015, C2016 and two approximate:O2UCT, CBK2018) are state-of-
the-art approaches to solving multi-step extensive-form StG and will be used as reference methods in the experimental
evaluation of EASG.
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4 Evolutionary Algorithm for Security Games
This section contains a detailed description of the proposed Evolutionary Algorithm for Security Games (EASG).
4.1 System overview
Generate initial set
of encoded Defender’s
mixed strategies
Is generations
limit reached?
Crossover:
Merge randomly selected
pairs of chromosomes
(mixed strategies)
Mutation:
Change actions in randomly selected
elements of chromosomes
(pure strategies)
Evaluation:
Calculate fitness function value
of all chromosomes - the Defender’s
payoff against the optimal
Attacker’s response to a strategy
encoded in a chromosome
Selection:
Choose chromosomes
for the next generation
Return best
Defender’s
strategy
No
next generation
Yes
Figure 1: An overview of EASG.
Figure 1 presents a flow-chart of the algorithm. Initially, a population of psize individuals (chromosomes) is randomly
generated. Each individual represents a potential solution - Defender’s mixed strategy. In each subsequent generation,
crossover and mutation operators are applied to randomly selected chromosomes from the current population, which
is then followed by a selection procedure that promotes individuals to the next generation based on their evaluation
(fitness). The fitness of a given chromosome is calculated as the Defender’s payoff (when the Defender plays a mixed
strategy represented by that chromosome) against an optimal Attacker’s response (an Attacker’s pure strategy yielding
the highest payoff for them).
The above procedure is executed until the best (found so far) Defender’s payoff does not change within nc iterations or
the limit for the number of generations ng is exceeded.
4.2 Chromosome representation
Each chromosome (individual) represents some Defender’s mixed strategy (a candidate SStE solution) in the form of a
vector of pure strategies piqi and their respective probabilities p
q
i :
CHq = {(piq1, pq1), . . . , (piqlq , p
q
lq
)},
lq∑
i=1
pqlq = 1, (3)
where lq is the length of chromosome CHq , i.e. the number of pure strategies included in the mixed strategy represented
by that chromosome. A particular form of a pure strategy dependents on game specificity. In the most common case, a
pure strategy is represented as a list of Defender’s actions in consecutive time steps.
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4.3 Initial population
Initial population contains solely pure strategies, i.e. ∀q lq = 1 ∧ pq1 = 1. These strategies are generated randomly in
the following way. For each strategy, in each time step the next action is selected uniformly from all actions available in
a given state. This procedure is independently executed for each chromosome in the initial population, i.e. psize times.
4.4 Crossover
In the first step of crossover operation, a subset of pc · psize individuals are randomly selected from the population,
where pc is crossover rate. Then, individuals from this subset are randomly paired (in the case of an odd number of
individuals, a randomly chosen one is removed). From each pair of individuals one new offspring chromosome is
created in the following way. All pure strategies from the parent chromosomes are merged into one mixed strategy with
their probabilities halved. Next, each pure strategy piqi in this newly created chromosome, except for the one with the
highest probability, is removed with probability (1 − pqi )2 (i.e. the lower the probability of a strategy the higher its
chance for being deleted). Afterwards, probabilities of the remaining pure strategies are normalized so as to sum up to
1. Note that the offspring chromosome inherits all pure strategies from both its parents and without such a reduction,
evaluation of the chromosome (computation of the respective Defender’s payoff) would be inefficient, due to a high
number of pure strategies with low probabilities.
The role of the crossover operator is to enhance exploitation aspect of the EA by means of mixing strategies found so
far. A sample crossover operation is presented in Fig. 2.
Figure 2: An example of crossover operation. Each row of circles represents a sequence of actions in consecutive time
steps (a Defender’s pure strategy), squares denote probabilities assigned the respective strategies. In the first step an
offspring chromosome contains all pure strategies inherited from the parents (with halved probabilities). Then some
strategies are potentially removed (in the example it is the one with the lowest probability) and probabilities of the
remaining strategies are normalized (to sum up to 1).
4.5 Mutation
The mutation operator is applied to each chromosome independently with probability pm. First, one pure strategy in the
chromosome is randomly chosen. Then iteratively, starting from a randomly selected time step ti up to the last time
step tn, an action in a considered time step tj , i ≤ j ≤ n is changed to an action uniformly chosen among all actions
available in the corresponding game state.
The role of the mutation operator is to boost exploration of the new areas of the search space. An example of mutation
operation is presented in Fig. 3.
4.6 Evaluation
The fitness of a chromosome is calculated as a Defender’s payoff when they play a mixed strategy encoded in that
chromosome. Since it is proven [12] that in StG there always exists at least one pure strategy of the follower which is
their best response to the leader’s strategy (pure or mixed), then it is sufficient to iteratively check all pure Attacker’s
5
Figure 3: An example of mutation operation. Each row of circles represents a sequence of actions in consecutive time
steps (a Defender’s pure strategy), squares denote probabilities assigned the respective strategies. In the presented case,
the second pure strategy is affected by the mutation operation, starting from the third time step.
strategies and select the one with the highest Attacker’s payoff (additionally breaking ties in favor of the Defender -
SStE condition). The Defender’s payoff against the best Attacker’s response found in the above described way is then
computed and returned as a chromosome fitness value.
4.7 Selection
In the first step of the selection procedure, e individuals from the current population with the highest fitness values
(including those created by mutation or crossover operations) are unconditionally promoted to the next generation
population. These individuals are called elite and transmit the top ranked solutions found so far through consecutive
generations.
Next, a binary tournament is iteratively executed until the next generation population is filled with psize individuals.
In each iteration, among all individuals in the current generation (including the mutated or crossed-over individuals)
two chromosomes are randomly chosen and, from this pair, the one with a higher fitness value is promoted to the next
generation with probability ps, otherwise the lower-fitted one is promoted.
5 Experimental setup
5.1 Benchmark games
Properties of EASG were tested on 3 sets of multi-step games with variable characteristic: Warehouse Games [20],
Search Games [14], and FlipIt Games [43], which were previously used in the literature for evaluation of various
state-of-the-art SG approaches. While all 3 types of games are defined on graphs, their rules, properties and related
challenges are vastly different, which makes them a truly diverse benchmark set.
5.1.1 Warehouse Games
The Warehouse Games (WHG) proposed in [20] are played on graphs which mimic the layouts of warehouse buildings.
Vertices represent storage rooms and corridors. Attacker and Defender start in fixed (different) vertices. In each time
step, each player can move to any of the neighboring vertices (directly connected through an edge) or stay in the
currently occupied vertex. The game ends in any of the following three cases:
a) players meet in the same vertex, which means interception of the Attacker - a negative payoff for the Attacker and a
positive one for the Defender,
b) the Attacker reaches one of the distinguished vertices (targets) and is not intercepted - the Attacker receives a
positive payoff and payoff of the Defender is negative,
c) none of the two above cases takes place in any of the n time steps - the payoff equals 0 for both playing sides.
The payoff structure is non-zero-sum. A more detailed description of these benchmark games is presented in [20]. The
number of steps in WHG varies between 3 and 8 which leads to the game trees of the sizes from 102 to 108 nodes.
For each number of steps t = 3, . . . , 8, 25 games were tested (150 different games in total). All test games were
downloaded from the website [44].
In WHG an action is in the form of a decision about the next node to be visited, hence in EASG application to WHG a
chromosome contains a list of nodes to be visited in consecutive time steps.
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5.1.2 Search Games
The Search Games (SEG) [14] are played on directed graphs. The Attacker’s goal is to reach one of the distinguished
target vertices, starting from a fixed initial vertex. Contrary to WHG, in SEG Defender controls several units and
furthermore these units cannot move freely on the entire graph but each of them has a subset of vertices assigned which
it is allowed to visit.
Another crucial difference compared to WHG is the property of partial observability. Namely, the Attacker leaves traces
in visited vertices which can be discovered by a Defender’s unit if they visit the node after the Attacker’s presence (in
one of the subsequent time steps). However, the Attacker has the ability to erase such a trace if they spend an additional
round in a given vertex (i.e. stay in this vertex in two or more consecutive time steps).
The end-of-game conditions are the same as in the WHG - the Defender obtains a positive payoff for catching the
Attacker, or the Attacker is rewarded for reaching a target vertex without being intercepted, or the game ends with
neutral payoffs after a certain number of rounds.
In total, 90 games with 4, 5, and 6 time steps, played on 3 different graph structures proposed in [14] were used in
the evaluation process. Attacker’s and Defender’s penalties were set to −1 and for each graph structure 10 random
distributions of rewards were sampled from interval [1, 2].
In order to be able to solve SEG instances the EASG chromosome representation needs to be extended. Formally, let’s
denote by Luvt a list of nodes visited in consecutive time steps by unit u in the case of trace discovery in node v at time
step t and by Lu∅ a list of nodes visited by unit u in the case of no trace discovery during the whole gameplay. Then, the
Defender’s pure strategy piD in SEG is of the following form: piD = {Luvt, u ∈ Du, v ∈ V, t ∈ {1, · · · , n}}∪{Lu∅ , u ∈
Du}, where Du is a set of Defender’s units, V is a set of graph vertices, n is the number of game steps.
Each pure strategy represents one of the possible compound scenarios, i.e. refers to all Defender’s units. For each unit
such a scenario is related to discovering or not (by that unit) a trace in any particular vertex, in any particular time
step during the entire game. A set of such pure strategies with assigned probabilities defines a mixed strategy for the
Defender, represented by a chromosome (cf. eq. (3)).
5.1.3 FlipIt Games
The FlipIt Games (FIG) [43] were initially proposed for evaluation of CBK2018 method [18]. FIG instances refer to
cybersecurity settings in which the Attacker attempts to gain control over (infect) certain resources (e.g. servers, hubs,
individual computers), and the Defender may take actions to restore their control on these infected units. The game is
played on a directed graph for a fixed number of rounds.
In each round, each of the players selects a node he/she attempts to take control of (to flip the node). Only some of the
nodes (so-called entry nodes) are publicly accessible and the Attacker is obliged to start gaining control and penetrate
the network from one of these nodes (in other words the only possible Attacker’s action in the first round is selection of
one of the entry nodes). A flip action is successful if the player controls also at least one of the preceding nodes (or it is
the entry node with no predecessors) and the current owner of the selected node does not take the flip action in this
node in the same round. Successful flip action results in gaining control on the flipped node.
At the beginning of the game all nodes are controlled by the Defender. Each node has assigned some cost, which is to
be paid at each flip attempt, and a reward for controlling it. The final player’s payoff is the sum of rewards from all
nodes controlled by him/her after each round (nodes controlled in multiple rounds count multiple times), decreased by
the costs of all flip attempts (either successful or failed).
In the experiments, 60 FIG instances played on 3 different graph structures proposed in [18] were used. For each graph,
5 different payoffs structures were randomly drawn. The number of rounds was set to 3, 4, 5 or 6. The experiments were
performed in No-Info game variant [18] in which players have no information about the results of their actions - they
are not aware of whether or not their flip action succeed and, therefore, their strategy is independent of the opponent’s
actions.
FIG are solved with the same EASG settings as in the case of WHG, with no specific adaptation. In particular, the form
of a chromosome does not change, i.e. strategies are represented as lists of nodes which the Defender attempts to flip in
consecutive game rounds.
5.2 EASG parametrization
EASG parameters were tuned on 50 WHG with 5 and 6 steps (excluded from the final tests). The initially selected
sets of parameter values are presented in Table 1. EASG was run 5 000 times, in each case with a random selection of
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(b) Mutation rate (pm).
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(d) Selection pressure (ps).
Figure 4: The average Defender’s payoff (circles) and computation time (squares) with respect to the main steering
parameters of EASG, calculated during the parameter tuning phase.
parameters (from Table 1) and a randomly chosen game. Figures. 4a- 4d present Defender’s payoff and computation
time for the respective tested parameter averaged across all trails. Based on these outcomes the final parameter values
(bolded in Table 1) were chosen, taking into account both the expected payoff and the running time.
parameter symbol value
population size psize 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500, 1000, 2000, 5000
# generations ng 1000
# generations with
no improvement nc 20
mutation rate pm 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1
crossover rate pc 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1
selection pressure ps 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 0.95, 1
# elite e 2
Table 1: Parameter values selected for the tuning process. Finally recommended values are bolded.
Figure 4a shows that increase of population size results in higher Defender’s payoffs, which is quite intuitive as more
individuals can explore strategy space and consequently the higher number of potential solutions is considered. For
small values (10 ≤ psize ≤ 100) a steep increase of the expected payoff can be observed, which subsequently flattens.
Computation time scales approximately linearly with psize.
A relation between the Defender’s payoff and mutation rate is presented in Fig. 4b. Mutation is a key element of the EA
process and without it (pm = 0) the Defender’s payoff deteriorates drastically. On the other hand, too high mutation
rate also entails payoff decrease, since the process is too disordered - the majority of strategies are randomly changed in
each generation. Computation time naturally grows along with the mutation rate increase due to increasing number of
chromosome modifications, but the increase is not as significant as in the case of population size (Fig. 4a).
Similarly to mutation, crossover is recognized as a critical operator in the EA process and its removal (pc = 0) causes
significant payoff decrease (Fig. 4c). At the same time, differences among payoffs for all other (positive) crossover
8
Figure 5: Visualization of typical EASG performance characteristics. The figures present payoffs of all chromosomes
in consecutive generations for two sample games. Dashed lines represent the optimal solutions (Defender’s payoffs in
SStE), solid curves denote the average payoffs across all individuals (in a given generation).
rate values are not significant. Clearly, the higher the pc the more crossover operations, and consequently the higher
computation time, but the time increase is not steep.
The selection pressure ps < 0.5 would mean that weaker individuals were more likely to be chosen. Hence, only
ps > 0.5 were tested with the best results obtained for ps = 0.9 (see Fig. 4d). Since this parameter does not affect the
number of EASG operations, computation time remains approximately constant for all values of ps.
6 Experimental evaluation of EASG
EASG is evaluated from four perspectives: convergence, results quality, stability, and time scalability. All presented
results were obtained in 30 independent runs per game instance, with parameters and implementation setup discussed in
the previous section. In total EASG assessment was based on 9 000 trials (150 WHG, 90 SEG and 60 FIG, each tested
30 times). All tests were run on Intel Xeon Silver 4116 @ 2.10GHz with 256GB RAM.
6.1 Convergence
Figure 5 visualizes two typical convergence characteristics of EASG. The payoffs of random strategies in the initial
population are usually centered around one (left figure) or two (right figure) values. In subsequent generations the
payoffs are more scattered but, generally, the mean Defender’s payoff increases in time, which means that the entire
population moves towards the areas with higher payoffs. At the same time, some low-payoff individuals exist in
practically all generations due to the use of mutation operator which leads to exploration of new strategies.
In none of the experiments EASG attained the maximum number of generations ng (set to 1 000) and in all runs
terminated because of the other stopping condition - no improvement of the best-found solution in consecutive nc
generations (set to 20).
Figure 6a presents a histogram of the numbers of generations in all experiments. The maximum value of 131 was
achieved in one of the 8 step WHG instances. In more than half of the cases, the number of generations was less than
30, which means that the final solution was found within the first 10 generations. This observation supports the claim
about generally fast and stable convergence of EASG.
6.2 Results quality
EASG as an approximate algorithm, obviously, does not guarantee finding optimal solutions. However, experimental
evaluation shows that in the majority of the cases the method yields optimal strategies (SStE ones) and in the rest of
them, a distance to the optimal solution is narrow.
In order to calculate the optimal solutions for considered game instances, both exact methods (BC2015 and C2016)
were run with the limit of 200h per game. If none of the methods were capable of finding the SStE strategy for the
Defender within allotted time, the game was excluded from the evaluation of results quality. In effect, 100 WHG (out of
150), 60 SEG (out of 90) and 45 FIG (out of 60) instances were used in the EASG quality assessment.
A histogram of the differences between the optimal solution and the one provided by EASG in all runs, across all tested
game instances with known optimal solutions is presented in Fig. 6b.
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Figure 6: (a): Histogram of the number of generations (for all games) before EASG termination. (b): Histogram of
differences between the optimal Defender’s payoffs and the payoffs obtained by EASG (for all games with known
optimal solutions).
Please note that FIG final payoffs are summed over all controlled vertices, in all rounds. Hence, in order to assure a
direct comparability with the results achieved for other game types, they were normalized to [−1; 1], i.e. the lowest and
the highest possible payoffs (computed by the exact method by minimizing and maximizing the expected Defender’s
payoff, resp.) were mapped to −1 and 1, respectively.
6.2.1 WHG
In the case of WHG, both exact methods were able to calculate the SStE for 100 games with 3− 6 time steps. In all
tests involving larger games (with 7 or 8 steps) the solution could not be reached due to extensive time requirements.
For 72 out of the above 100 games EASG obtained optimal solutions. The mean difference between the optimal and
EASG results was equal to 0.0013 and the highest difference equaled 0.0127 (3.7% of the possible payoff range).
6.2.2 SEG
For SEG, optimal solutions are known for 60 games with 4 and 5 steps out of which EASG found optimal strategies
in 28 cases (47%). The average divergence from the optimal results equaled 0.0253 with the highest value of 0.0955
(12.2% of the possible payoff range).
In spite of satisfying results, it should be noted that they are noticeably worse than those for WHG. The reason for that
is most probably much larger strategy representation - SEG require strategies for several (more than one) Defender’s
units, additionally with specific variants for the cases of discovering traces, so the effective strategy search space is
much wider than that of WHG.
In order to verify this hypothesis, additional experiments with bigger populations were executed. If the reason for a
relative deterioration of results is indeed SEG’s larger strategy space and reacher solution representation, increasing
population size should cause a more extensive search of the strategy space and yield better results. The outcomes of
these experiments, presented in Figure 7, confirm that with greater populations EASG was able to find optimal solutions
for a higher percentage of SEG instances, albeit at the cost of computation time increase.
6.2.3 FIG
The third set of games - FIG are also recognized as a challenging task for SGs solution methods due to their extensive
search space. Please note that FIG game trees grow very fast even for small graphs since in each round (except for
the first one in which some restrictions on the Attacker’s choice apply) any of the two players can attempt to flip any
of graph vertices (not only a successor of his/her current position). For a graph with nv vertices, in each non-initial
round, each of the players has nv available actions, so the number of nodes in a game tree exceeds n2n−1v , where n is
the number of rounds.
Despite large strategy space, EASG managed to achieve optimal solutions in 73% of the cases (exact methods were
capable of finding solutions for 45 test games, out of which EASG yielded the same solutions for 33 games). The
average divergence from the optimal results (normalized in a way described above) equaled 0.0087 with the highest
value of 0.0321 (6.4% of the possible payoff range).
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Figure 7: A fraction of SEG instances for which EASG found optimal solutions (circles) and computation time
requirements (squares) with respect to the population size.
The quality of results for FIG is comparable to that for WHG and higher than in the case of SEG. Again, the reason
for this results disparity is attributed to a much complex chromosome representation in SEG. While in FIG and
WHG solutions (leader’s mixed strategies) are encoded straightforwardly, in SEG each chromosome contains separate
strategies for each unit and each possible trace discovery scenario (depending on both the vertex and time step). Hence,
finding optimal strategy in such a complex space representation is more difficult in a stochastic strategy changing
process performed by EASG operators.
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(a) Warehouse Games.
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(c) FlipIt Games.
Figure 8: Comparison of EASG time scalability vs state-of-the-art methods. Please note a logarithmic scale on both
axes.
6.3 Stability
The EASG approach, typically for EA methods, is highly non-deterministic (the initial population, both operators, as
well as the selection procedure contain random factors). Hence, the sole ability to obtain optimal solutions, discussed in
the previous subsection, is not sufficient for the comprehensive EASG assessment. An equally important aspect of the
algorithm is its ability to reproduce good results.
In order to check stability of EASG, standard deviations were computed for all games (including those omitted in the
previous subsection due to the lack of exact solutions) across 30 runs for each game. For 45% of games, standard
deviation was equal to 0 which means perfect stability. The mean standard deviation equaled 0.0059 with the maximal
value 0.1629 (36.7% of the possible payoff range).
Among 133 games for which the optimal solutions were found, the best solution was repeated in all 30 runs in 82 (62%)
cases. For 96 of these games (72%) the optimal solution was found in more than 90% of runs. At the other extreme, in
23 cases (17%) the optimal strategy was achieve only once. The above figures indicate that, despite certain level of
randomness, the method offers relatively high stability and is capable of regularly reproducing the optimal solution in
the vast majority of the tested games.
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6.4 Time scalability
Parameter tuning presented in Section 5.2 indicates that time performance of EASG strongly depends on selected
steering parameters. Hence, their adjustment allows establishing the expected balance between computation time and
quality of results.
Figure 8 compares time efficiency of EASG (with parameters setting listed in Table 1) vs four state-of-the-art algorithms
summarized in Section 3. First, the games of a given type (separately WHG, SEG and FIG) were divided into subsets of
instances with pairwise comparable game tree sizes (after rounding pairwise equal to the nearest power of 10). Then,
for each subset the running times of all game instances belonging to that subset were averaged and plotted. As we
mentioned in section 6.2, due to exceeding time limit of 200 hours per trial, for biggest games the results of exact
methods (BC2015 and C2016) could not be plotted.
Computation times of all five methods grow exponentially with respect to the game length. However, in the case of
MILP-based algorithms (BC2015, C2016 and CBK2018) the exponents are higher than in the case of approximate
approaches (O2UCT and EASG). Overall, EASG demonstrates the highest time efficiency among the tested methods.
7 Conclusions
The paper presents a novel Evolutionary Algorithm approach (named EASG) to solving sequential Security Games. The
method explores the space of Defender’s strategies by means of evolving a population of candidate strategies in order to
find Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium. Proposed approach is generic and can be easily adapted to various types of SGs.
Experimental evaluation, performed on games of 3 different types, with 300 instances in total, proved robustness and
time efficiency of EASG. In more than half of the tested game instances optimal solutions were found and for the rest
of them the distance between strategies found by EASG and the optimal ones was very low.
Comprehensive experiments demonstrate that EASG scales in time visibly better than state-of-the-art approaches.
Consequently, the proposed method can be applied to bigger games (in terms of the size of a game tree or Defender’s
strategy space) than state-of-the-art MILP methods. Even though the convergence properties of EASG cannot be
mathematically guaranteed (as is the case of the vast majority of EA-based approaches), promising experimental results
make us to believe that the method presents a viable alternative to state-of-the-art algorithms when solving larger and
more complex sequential SGs.
Another property of the proposed method, which is of a special value in time-critical applications, is its iteration-based
construction. Execution of EASG can be interrupted at any moment and still a valid solution (the best one found so far)
will be returned, which makes the approach essentially an anytime method.
Most of the EASG computation time is devoted to evaluation of chromosomes due to the necessity of calculation of their
payoff against all possible Attacker’s pure strategies. Although it is not a serious issue in many real-life applications
(where the Attacker’s strategy space is usually of moderate size), in some cases (e.g. for games with continuous
Attacker’s strategy space) it may cause certain inefficiency of the method. Therefore, our current work is concentrated
on mitigating this potential problem by designing a co-evolutionary approach in which a population of Defender’s
mixed strategies would compete with a population of the Attacker’s strategies, so as to provide the optimal Stackelberg
Equilibrium strategies for both players.
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